It's "classified by default" out of concern for a certain principle, ergo the act of classification is applied in a knee-jerk (i.e. thoughtless, reflexive) manner.
In my opinion, "classified by default" is not a thoughtless, reflexive policy when discussing espionage and counter-espionage work. It's a principle that you'll come up with after pondering the risks and benefits of other processes.
As a concept, it's similar to policies in corporate offices where doors are locked and guests can only walk in through a reception, accompanied by a trusted employee. Yes, you're applying a process that is unnecessary in 95 % of cases, but still it's one of the "best practices" in the business.
I didn't say it was. I said it precipitates the act of reflexive classification by the body politic of whatever three-letter agency we're talking about.
The process is as follows:
1) Rational, principled decision: "when in doubt, classify"
2) Conservative application: "I'll just classify everything to avoid 'misses'"
3) Everything gets classified because nobody ever got fired for classifying
Treat it as a signal detection problem. There's obvious incentive to avoid "misses" (i.e. not classifying things that should be classified) so people produce many false alarms (i.e. classifying things that should be public knowledge).
This hi-lights a problem with current doctrine: "classify by default" has unintended consequences, namely a creeping increase in non-transparency.
Further, and returning to the original point: since reflexive classification happens as a result of official doctrine, the two are semantically equivalent and this discussion is officially running around in circles.
