That's true for your local machine, and I think it's a reasonable threat model for that.
If you do development for servers, though, (1) multiuser systems do exist where no or most users do not have sudo access, and (2) privilege separation accounts (such as www for httpd) generally do not run interactive shells. If you can escalate from an untrusted user on a multiuser system or from a non-interactive shell account to root, that's a problem. Dropping this alias won't help you on either of these kinds of system, which are important real world scenarios (but maybe not a scenario you need to care about personally).
If you do development for servers, though, (1) multiuser systems do exist where no or most users do not have sudo access, and (2) privilege separation accounts (such as www for httpd) generally do not run interactive shells. If you can escalate from an untrusted user on a multiuser system or from a non-interactive shell account to root, that's a problem. Dropping this alias won't help you on either of these kinds of system, which are important real world scenarios (but maybe not a scenario you need to care about personally).