> Psychiatric research doesn’t support the notion of simple cause and effect in mental health, instead uncovering a far more complex and indeterminate picture of vulnerabilities. There is no evidence to justify the continued promotion of one-dimensional theories such as ‘chemical imbalance’.
I wholeheartedly agree with this, and believe that it's a huge problem with the mental health discourse. However, the author then goes on to say:
> Mental health treatment needs to re-engage with the language of persons. This means suspending the detached, third-person stance toward patients, and attending to their actual experience and circumstances. And it means encouraging patients themselves to avoid this stance and draw on the normal ways that people make sense of their emotions and actions.
A problem I've experienced is that "the normal ways that people make sense of their emotions and actions" do not seem to work for me. I haven't found a good description of it, but something in my sensory and cognitive feedback loop seems to be broken such that I don't get any useful sense of things in the moment and need to reverse-engineer my emotional state after the fact when it seems important to do so (NB: I don't just mean that this disconnect occurs when there's some kind of intense moment; it's pretty much constant). So I don't see how it's possible to both hold that up as the standard and also respect my "actual experience and circumstances". In other words, this sure seems like exactly the sort of one-dimensional theory of mental illness that the author decried earlier.
> Psychiatric research doesn’t support the notion of simple cause and effect in mental health, instead uncovering a far more complex and indeterminate picture of vulnerabilities. There is no evidence to justify the continued promotion of one-dimensional theories such as ‘chemical imbalance’.
I wholeheartedly agree with this, and believe that it's a huge problem with the mental health discourse. However, the author then goes on to say:
> Mental health treatment needs to re-engage with the language of persons. This means suspending the detached, third-person stance toward patients, and attending to their actual experience and circumstances. And it means encouraging patients themselves to avoid this stance and draw on the normal ways that people make sense of their emotions and actions.
A problem I've experienced is that "the normal ways that people make sense of their emotions and actions" do not seem to work for me. I haven't found a good description of it, but something in my sensory and cognitive feedback loop seems to be broken such that I don't get any useful sense of things in the moment and need to reverse-engineer my emotional state after the fact when it seems important to do so (NB: I don't just mean that this disconnect occurs when there's some kind of intense moment; it's pretty much constant). So I don't see how it's possible to both hold that up as the standard and also respect my "actual experience and circumstances". In other words, this sure seems like exactly the sort of one-dimensional theory of mental illness that the author decried earlier.