This is a bit cynical isn't it, when the author is clearly being as transparent as possible about what they need and why, which is due to factors outside their control.
Of course you're right in a technical sense. They could do whatever they want later.
But still let's celebrate and attitude like this rather than criticizing it.
This has been used as an attack vector in the past: spot reasonably popular plugin; make author an offer; inject whatever tracking/other malwate stuff new owners want (typically after a delay).
So now we'd have to trust the author to do thorough vetting of a potential buyer and also not sell if vetting is inconclusive. And this against an adversary aiming to cheat their way past vetting.
Might be a cynical take, but it is not one without reason.
As a sibling comment points out, this is due to the permission model. This doesn't let the author entirely of the hook though: the permissions model created the situation, the author chose a particular path. The consequences may not have been foreseen by either, but they do exist and affect users.
>the permissions model created the situation, the author chose a particular path.
perhaps the most reasonable or even only possible path if they wanted their plugin to be able to do what they wanted it to do, which was to keep sites and from messing with your copy and paste functionality - in other words to prevent minor maliciousness.
on edit: sure, to provide the smoothest behavior, but really if it wasn't smooth people would be irritated and not want to use it. I know if I was implementing for myself I would want it to be smooth.
I understand the whole "bad things can be done" perspective, but here for some reason I fall under a "trust but verify" perspective instead.
It's not cynical - see what happened to ublock. That kind of mess has happened, and will continue to happen, and should be a factor in what you choose to trust.
The extension in the Chrome Web Store (CWS) never changed hands. I just reverse-forked a GitHub repo, which was of no consequences to those who installed the extension from the CWS. I was asked to transfer the CWS entry, I refused. This can't be compared to an extension changing hands or going rogue in the CWS.
Wasn't the worst that happened with it that the guy who took over uBlock tried to take credit for it and asked for donations? Not like he could get away with anything outright illegal when everyone knew he was running the project.
The Wiki article has a brief summary of the history, but basically the original author wanted to transfer responsibility for the user-facing maintenance to someone else, who started seeking donations and (I believe) taking payment for "acceptable ads" and the like.
Nope. People are being asked to give a bunch of deep access to their system, it's not enough for the author to have pure intensions and explain why they asked. The user should understand the risks, many of which are non-obvious (like the extension being sold).
Let's put it this way: there have been FLOSS projects whose maintainers intentionally pushed compromised code to unsuspecting end users. See for example the colors attack.
What leads you to believe that good intentions are enough?
> Let's put it this way: there have been FLOSS projects whose maintainers intentionally pushed compromised code to unsuspecting end users. See for example the colors attack.
Following this logic, we should all stop using any and all software for which we haven't personally inspected the full source code for, since this could happen to any of them.
A more reasonable take would be to assess your risk tolerance and the possible benefit for each piece of software you install, and then make the best decision for yourself based on that assessment.
For some people, that means not running an extension that provides minor quality of life improvements due to the possibility of it turning malicious further down the road. For other people, it means the opposite.
Not sure why every security-related conversation devolves into one extreme vs. another extreme. Security must be appropriately balanced against risk tolerance, inconvenience, and a number of individual concerns and preferences.
If you personally think extensions are too much of a security risk for you, sure, don't use them. But please don't comment "ackshually extensions are insecure and using them is a bad idea" on every post about a browser extension. We already know the risks, it's explained when you install them, we don't need to hear the same lecture every day.
>But please don't comment "ackshually extensions are insecure and using them is a bad idea"
I haven't? My first comment on this entire topic is the one you are replying to... And it can be summed up as "risk tolerance and security decisions is personal".
Of course you're right in a technical sense. They could do whatever they want later.
But still let's celebrate and attitude like this rather than criticizing it.