Imagine the memory on their server is encrypted with an on-processor key (something like intel SGX) -- reading OS memory, e.g dumping from linux or hardware, you can't read it unless you somehow extract the key (which are different on each chip) from the physical chip. Now, the process running using that encrypted memory generates TLS keys for you to send the data, and operates on it only inside this secure enclave.
There is no way to access it without destroying the chip, and even in this scenario it will be extremely expensive and imo unlikely, certainly impossible at scale. Some scientists may be able to do it once in a lab.
BTW there is an entire industry popping up around exactly this sort of use case, it's called 'confidential computing' and CNCF have some software in the works (confidential containers iirc). I'm pretty excited to see what risc-v is going to bring to the party enclave wise.
